In this paper we analyse the short-term stock price behaviour following a period of large stock price changes. We compare the price behaviour of A shares owned by domestic investors and B shares owned by foreign investors in the two Chinese markets, Shanghai and Shenzhen. We find significant differences across the two types of shares. We show that, while the prices of the A shares are relatively random in the short-term window (up to 10 days) after the price shock, those of the B shares carry on increasing significantly after both the positive and negative shocks. This trend is more pronounced for large shares with high liquidity, in contrast to the efficient market hypotheses expectations, which suggests that any abnormal performance should be arbitraged away sooner in a frictionless (in this case liquid) market. In the post-2001 period when the B shares are open to domestic investors, we find a significant drop in the post-shock abnormal returns in B shares. We relate these results to the high level of optimism of foreign investors. 
Introduction
Under the efficient market hypothesis, share prices reflect all information available to market participants. This hypothesis precludes any abnormal profit opportunities as share price changes cannot be predicted and past returns are not correlated with future returns. However, recent empirical studies report that past prices can predict future price movements and that investment strategies based on historical returns can generate subsequent risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Starting with DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Jegadesh and Titman (1993) , a number of studies provide evidence in favor of long-run overreaction and short-term momentum, and conclude that markets have a tendency to overreact over a medium-term and underreact at long-run horizons as information is not immediately, fully and appropriately compounded in share prices the moment it is released.
1 This evidence suggests that markets are not efficient and that trading profits can be obtained by following some set of appropriately designed trading strategies. Other studies, on the other hand, suggest that any deviation from the efficient market hypothesis that results in abnormal returns over the short-or the long-term is likely to be due to chance and sample-specific or that, even if the anomalies existed in the sample period in which they were first identified, they tend to disappear once detected and made public (See Fama, 1998, and Schwert, 2003 , for a review of market anomalies and efficiency issues). Khandani and Lo (2007) show that contrarian strategies are in recent years less profitable. They back-tested a proxy for a typical strategy, involving buying the previous day's losing stocks and selling the winners. Such a strategy would have delivered a daily return of 1.38% before (substantial) costs in 1995 but the return fell steadily to 0.15% a day in 2006.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this debate by examining the daily stock market behavior of foreign and domestic investors following large price changes which we refer to as "shocks" or "stressful circumstances". Chinese stock markets constitute an excellent laboratory for this work due to the two types of shares, A and B that can be traded by domestic investors and by foreign investors respectively. We investigate whether underreaction or overreaction exists in these two types of shares, reflecting the differences in the market perception of the two types of investors that owns them; whether the post-shock reaction changes through time; and whether the post-shock reaction is related to differences in market liquidity across these stocks. We expand the previous literature on stock returns by investigating the circumstances under which the momentum anomaly and the well documented biases, such as over-reaction, trend-following, and optimism, considered in the literature to drive this phenomenon, are observed for both or only one particular type of investor. In addition to the possible home bias measured through the country of origin of the investors, we investigate if the post-shock biases are triggered by the liquidity of the shares measured by volume of trade, previous performance (momentum), and market capitalization. We also document whether after the abolition in 2001 of the limitations of the country of origin of the traders, this bias was reduced. This test gives us an additional opportunity to investigate if market behavior converges following the change in the identity of the trader.
Our approach differs from much of the existing literature. First, unlike Lasfer, Melnik and Thomas (2003) , we focus on individual-company price performance, not indices. In contrast to previous studies that used individual stock price data (e.g., Bremer and Sweeney, 1991; Cox and Peterson, 1994; Park, 1995) , we overcome the associated problems of attempting to isolate differences in the risk profile of the individual stocks by relating each firm's stock returns to its level of risk. We consider each individual stock in terms of its historic price volatility both in identifying shocks and in evaluating that stock's post-shock performance. In addition, we investigate the post-shock performance taking account of the stock's size and other factors that are expected to affect the size of the shock and the speed with which it is absorbed. Second, following previous studies that have looked at indices or long-term returns (e.g., Cox and Peterson, 1994; Howe, 1986; Lasfer et al, 2003; and Lehman, 1990) , we analyze the momentum and reversal behavior over short-time periods.
Our motivation has theoretical as well as practical grounds. First, we use international data to test the predominantly US evidence. Fama and French (1996) argue that tests based on international data are desirable to establish whether US evidence is indicative of the general behaviour or is a special case. Second, the importance of further investigation is emphasised by the interest of fund managers in formulating portfolio strategies to exploit such a possible reaction and by the recent unprecedented volatility in stock prices and rapid growth in hedge funds. Large price shocks create both a potential for large profits and an increase in risks. However, we expect any predictability in post-shock responses to be quickly arbitraged away and that overreaction or underreaction would diminish over time because of the increase in the speed of transmission of financial data, and the pressures on fund managers and hedge funds to capture any predictable post-shock reactions. This arbitrage activity is likely to depend on a set of characteristics of the stock and the trader. In particular, we expect the arbitrage to be more difficult in less-liquid stock. 2 Thus, we anticipate that post-shock returns in these stocks would take longer to be absorbed and dissipated. In addition, we consider that the arbitrage will depend on the identity of the trader and how distant is the trader to the location of the stock (Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 2002) . Therefore, we hypothesize that since A shares are owned by local investors, they will be more likely to be arbitraged than B shares. Third, the distinction between foreign and local investors allows us to test some behavioural finance hypotheses. We test whether abnormal profit opportunities after price shocks are due to behavioural biases in human nature. In particular, we investigate the three well documented biases, overreaction, trend-following and optimism in a coherent framework and describe the conditions that trigger them. International fund managers are keen on exploiting such biases to come up with successful trading strategies. Large price shocks in the Chinese A and B shares constitute a potential for large profits if predictable post-shock reactions can be traced and, because of liquidity issues, post shock returns will take longer to be arbitraged away, resulting in persistence in stock prices after the shocks. Finally, previous studies have documented some specificities in the trading patterns of Chinese investors that lead to a lack of predictability of the trades of institutional and individual investors due probably to the speculative nature of Chinese equity markets (see Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2005) , the relatively inexperienced Chinese individual investors and differences in their trading behaviour. Ng and Wu (2007) report that less wealthy individual investors are contrarians, but Chinese institutions adopt momentum strategies, some wealthy individuals tend to behave like institutions when they buy stocks, but behave like less wealthy individuals when they sell, individual investors at large have no predictive power for future stock returns.
We use a very rich dataset that includes all shares traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges since their establishment in the early 1990s to 2004. We first compute the daily returns of each stock and then compare each of these returns to the average return in the previous 60 days. If the difference in these returns is higher than two standard deviations, we consider that return as a shock and assess the subsequent 10 days returns. The results show significant differences between the two types of shares but not between the two markets. For the A shares, the post-shock returns are relatively random in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. These results could be driven by the conflicting trading strategies adopted by individual and institutional investors in
China (e.g., Ng and Wu, 2007) . In contrast, we report strong evidence of optimistic behaviour for shares traded by foreign investors (B-shares), as positive abnormal returns follow both positive and negative shocks. The optimism we observe is more pronounced for large shares with high liquidity. This is contrary to the expectations of the proponents of the EMH that abnormal returns would be arbitraged away sooner if there is less friction, such as liquidity in this case. We also document that after the 2001 reform that allowed local investor to hold the B shares, the post-shock abnormal returns decreased significantly, suggesting that most of the optimism is driven by the presence of foreign investors in the Chinese markets. These results led us to conclude that the optimism we observe is due to human nature. Previous studies have reported optimism in several other domains. 3 However, to our knowledge, our study is the first to test the optimism to the price recovery process in an international market with predominantly institutional investors.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a review of literature. In Section 3 we introduce the Institutional framework of Chinese stock markets. In Section 3 we describe the data and methodology used. Section 4 presents findings and Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical background

Review of the literature
A number of previous studies report that, in the long run, stock prices overreact.
For example, Thaler (1985, 1987) hypothesize that following certain shocks, stock prices take temporary swings away from their fundamental values. They argue that investors tend to overreact to extreme price changes due to the tendency to over-weigh current information and under-weigh prior data. If prices tend to overshoot their target levels after a large shock, the price reversal will reflect a movement back to equilibrium. Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) incorporate size, prior returns and betas in their regressions to find that loser portfolios, formed on the basis of prior 5-year returns, outperform winners by 5% to 10% per year during the subsequent 5 years.
Studies based on non-US data (e.g., Richards, 1995 Richards, , 1997 also show that in the first six months after portfolio formation, winners continue to outperform losers, but over the subsequent three and four year, losers outperform winners. These overreaction results led a number of researchers to devise contrarian trading rules of buying losers and selling winners (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994 ). 4 In contrast, studies based on medium-term horizons of typically between 3 and 12 months indicate that prices underreact to information. This delayed price reaction to firm-specific news enables momentum strategies. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that stocks with high returns over a given time period (of 3 to 12 months) continue to outperform the firms with lower past returns in the same period. Using US data, a large number of studies 5 provide evidence supporting momentum strategies. Similar results are documented by Liu, Strong and Xu (1999) in the UK, Rouwenhorst (1998) and Lasfer et al (2003) 6 using international equity market data, and Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) using Asian markets data.
Although the momentum and overreaction strategies appear to provide diametrically opposed predictions about the returns of past winners and losers, the two strategies are not necessarily inconsistent because of the different time scales used in empirical studies. However, both sets of results appear to provide some evidence of 'market inefficiency'. Proponents of the efficient market hypothesis suggest that the results are a compensation for other factors or are the product of data mining. In particular, the overreaction results are attributed to time-varying risk effects (Chan, 1988; Ball and Kothari, 1989) , distressed firm effects (Chan and Chen, 1991) , size effects (Fama and French, 1988; Zarowin, 1990) , and market microstructure-related effects (Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 1995) . Similarly, the apparent profitability of momentum strategies is variously linked to the cross-sectional variability in expected returns , book-to-market effects, trading volume, and the extent of analyst coverage (Asness, 1997; Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Hong, Lee and Stein, 2000) . The purpose of our paper is to contribute to this controversial literature by investigating the under/overreaction in the very short-term investor response to major price changes in individual stock returns in A and B shares in the two main Chinese markets. The next section provides details in the institutional framework in China. As a result, the A and B share markets were segmented and price recovery processes in the two markets have been different (Allen and Quian, 2005) . We test whether our results are affected by this change in the regulation by comparing the price behaviour after the shock in the pre-and post-legislative reform.
Institutional Framework
China constitutes an excellent laboratory for our purposes for the following shares turnover being about four times the turnover of B shares and fetch a high premium over B shares (Mei, et.al., 2005) possibly due to speculative trading rather than liquidity. 8 Second, Chinese residents have stringent short sale constraints such that investor accounts are kept centrally, investor position is checked through a computerised system before each trade and it is illegal to short-sell. Moreover there are no futures and options markets where the Chinese residents can trade in China.
Naturally this affects mainly the price recovery mechanism for A shares that are restricted to domestic residents but not the B shares that are traded by foreigners, i.e.
international investors who can trade without such restrictions elsewhere in the world.
Finally, Chinese stock markets are dominated by individual investors as mutual funds and pension funds are still in their infant stages of development (Mei, et.al., 2004) . By the end of 1999 about 85% of tradable shares were held by individuals with little previous experience and about 15% were held by institutions (Tenev, Zhang and Berefort, 2002) . Overall, the strict short-sale constraints and lack of previous trading experience Chinese investors were expected to exhibit overconfidence in their trading behaviour (Mei, et.al., 2005) .
Data and Methodology
Data comes from Perfect Analysis and includes 1,337 stocks that were listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the launch of the first stock markets in China in 01/1991 to 12/2004, resulting in about 120,000 daily observations in both markets. Our sample covers all industry sectors and includes live as well as dead companies. Following Lasfer et al, (2003) , we define a positive (negative) price shock on day t=0 when the return on a particular day is above (below) two standard deviations of the average returns computed over the fifty days, between t= -60 to -11, ten days prior to the price shock. 9 The daily return (R i,t ) on stock i on day t is the log difference between two successive days' closing prices. After computing the price shocks, the post-shock Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARi,t) are calculated starting from the day after the price shock as follows: Abnormal return on day t for stock i is given as
, the difference between R i,t ,the daily return of the share i on day t, and E(R i,t ), the expected return on stock i in day t which is calculated as the average return of the 60-day window ending 10 trading days before the price shock. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the t-tests used to test if CARs are significantly different form zero (Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbel, Lo, MacKinley, 1997) are calculated for the ten trading days following the shock as follows:
where, s(ACAR T )= s(AR T )/(T+1) ½ and s(AR T ) is the variance over T days.
The next step in our analysis is to determine whether the cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by a number of firm-specific and trading related factors, such as the stock exchange in which the share is listed, the class of shares, company size, trading volume, previous performance of the share prices and the size of the shock. We first partition the data accordingly and analyze whether the CARs we calculate are robust to these factors. Next, we run the following regression for positive and negative shocks and A, and B shares separately so as to test formally for the effect of these factors on CARs:
In equation 3, CAR is defined as above in equation 1, a stands for constant, JUMP is the "shock" measured as percentage change in price on event day, VOLUME represents the volume of trade on event day, SIZE is measured as the log of market capitalization, B is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the time is after 2001 and local residents can trade B shares as well as foreign investors and zero otherwise, EXCHANCE takes the value 1 if the share is traded in Shanghai and zero if traded in Shenzhen, TREND is the price performance of the share before the shock and is measured as the percentage price change over the past sixty days before the jump. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our sample classified by the stock exchange and class of shares. Over the fourteen year research period we investigate, a total of 116,727 price shocks of which 58,195 were positive and 58,532 were negative.
The mean positive shock is about 6% and the mean negative shock is about -6.2%. The magnitude of the shocks in China appears to be higher compared to the average shocks in other markets. For example, Lasfer et al. (2003) report mean positive (negative) shocks of 2.37% (-2.34%) for developed markets and 3.62% (-3.48) for emerging markets. Table 1 [Insert Table 1 here]
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Empirical results Table 2 presents the average post-shock returns cumulated over the ten days following the shock. For clarity purposes we report only CAR1, CAR5 and CAR10.
Post Shock Returns
The full results are portrayed in Figure 1 However, the trend is not linear as the mean abnormal return on the day following the positive shock is 0.0031, but the cumulative abnormal returns deteriorate over the next five days and reach 0.0019 on day five and then they start picking up and reach 0.0062 on day 10. For the negative shocks, the cumulative abnormal returns one day after the shock (CAR1) are negative (-0.0005) but they revert in day 5 to reach 0.0009 and increase to 0.0061 in day 10. These overall results do not provide full support for the momentum behaviour as observed in major international stock indices (e.g., Lasfer, 2003) .
The remaining panels show strong differences in the post-shock cumulative abnormal returns between the two markets and between the two types of stocks. For the A shares, the results do not support fully the momentum or the under-reaction hypotheses, as the post-shock abnormal returns are mainly insignificant and inconsistent in sign (Table 2 (Table 2 , Panel E. and Figure 2 ), as share prices increase linearly from 0.0076 in day 1 to 0.0376 in day 10. These results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Lasfer et al, 2003) and indicate that 10 days from the day of the shock (of 0.0705 as shown in Table   1 ), share prices increase by 0.1081. These results suggest that share prices have underreacted to the positive shock. Alternatively, our results may suggest that foreign investors are too optimistic and expect the increase in prices to continue in the future.
Interestingly, the results also indicate that prices increase after negative shocks (Table 2 , Panel F. and Figure 4 ). After a decrease in share prices by -0.0667 (Table 1 The respective value for B shares are 0.0081 and 0.0115 (p = 0.00).
Overall the results are interesting on two grounds. First we observe momentum following positive shocks and overreaction following negative shocks. Second we observe this strong positive behaviour more significantly in B shares that are owned by foreign investors rather than in A shares where the post-shock returns appear to be relatively random. These trends in B shares could indicate optimism which has been widely documented in other domains (e.g., Kahneman and Reipe, 1998) and in stock price forecasts in other emerging markets (Muradoglu, 2002) but not in relation to market behaviour in empirical work. In addition, since the behaviour for A and B shares are differentiated in terms of the speed of adjustment to the shock, our analysis could presents a good opportunity to indicate that the observed optimism in market reactions is caused by the different attributes of market participants. We test further the hypothesis that the level of optimism, rather than the over-or under-reaction, is driving our results by undertaking a number of additional robustness checks. shocks. In all other cases, following shocks, CARs in January are lower than CARs in other months of the year. Overall, we cannot detect any particular trend in the after shock cumulative abnormal returns confined to a particular year or a month of the year in the sample.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Risk Overhang, Initial Shock and Liquidity
We assess the impact of liquidity by examining the relation between after shock
CARs and the depth of the initial shock We hypothesize that the larger the shock the lower the amount of liquidity as the number of shares traded will be lower and therefore higher the after-shock CARs. For robustness, we use two other variables that indicate liquidity. We use volume of trade scaled by market capitalisation of the company and hypothesize that for higher levels of trading volume lower will be the after-shock CARs. We use market capitalisation scaled by logarithms and hypothesize that larger the company, the more liquid the shares and thus the lower the after-shock CARs will be. We scale the actual trading volume on the day of the jump with total market capitalisations. The second measure of liquidity we use is the market capitalisation of the company itself. We rank the actual jumps and analyse the after-shock CARs in ten deciles form low to high in both cases. Table 4 reports the results for portfolios ranked according to volume of trade.
Almost all of the CARs are statistically significantly different from zero, and there are some economically significant cases. For A shares, following both positive and negative shocks, we observe that CARs are higher for companies with lower volume of trade. 
Trends prior to initial shock
We test the hypothesis that investors extrapolate the previous performance to form their expectations of the future performance after the shock by first ranking all the firms in the sample into ten deciles according to the average return over the 60 days before the initial shock, and then analyse the cumulative abnormal returns up to days after the shock. Table 6 For example, in Shanghai, the CAR10 of B shares following negative shock amount to 0.0989 for companies that did badly in the pre-shock period, compared to -0.0702 for companies that did very well (p = 0.00). Similarly, in Shenzhen, CAR10 or companies that did badly amount to 0.0944 compared to -0.0749 for companies that did very well in the pre-shock period (p = 0.00).
[Insert table 6 here] Table 7 reports the results of the regression estimates that analyse the determinants of the post-shock cumulative abnormal returns. We estimate twelve regression equations one each for CAR1, CAR5 and CAR5 and using different subsamples for A and B shares and for negative and positive jumps using OLS estimators.
Regression results
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The explanatory variables include size of the jump, JUMP, the trading volume, VOLUME, the size of the company as measured by the log of market value of equity, SIZE, the exchange in which the stock is listed, EXCHANGE, the trend in share prices 
Conclusions
In this study, we investigate the three well documented biases, overreaction, trend-following and optimism in a coherent framework using large price shocks in the Chinese A and B shares. We find significant differences across the two types of stocks.
In particular, we show that the behaviour of A shares after positive and negative shocks is relatively random. In contrast, that of B shares, owned primarily by foreign investors, exhibit significant momentum following positive and negative shocks. We test for the robustness of our results using other measures of frictions including the volume of trade and market capitalisation that indicate liquidity. For shares with higher volume of trade optimism is reduced as expected. However, the optimism is more pronounced for large shares traded by foreigners in Shenzhen. This is contrary to the expectations of the EMH that abnormal returns would be arbitraged away sooner if there is less friction, such as liquidity in this case. Therefore we conclude that the optimism we observe might be due to human behaviour, i.e. the optimism in foreign investors about the new technology companies traded in Shenzhen in this case. We also document that the 2001 regulatory change which allowed domestic investors to trade in B shares has reduced significantly the post-shocks abnormal returns. Finally, we document that, while for A shares the relationship between the post-shock abnormal returns and the explanatory variables is not constant across the various cumulative abnormal returns, for B shares all the post-shock abnormal returns are consistently related to the size of the jump, the trading volume, the size of the company, and the pre-shock trend in returns. 
